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Abstract 
This paper explores the dynamics of price-cost mark-ups using firm-level data, paying 
particular attention to the crisis period 2008-2011. To this end, we apply the econometric 
framework developed by Klette (1999) to a comprehensive sample of Spanish non-financial 
corporations in order to estimate price-cost mark-ups for the period 1995-2011 at the 
aggregate and sectoral levels. The results reveal a widespread pattern of increasing price-
cost mark-ups since 2008, both by industry and firm size. Moreover, with the aim of 
interpreting the pattern identified in our findings, we also relate the changes in our industry-
level estimates of price-cost margins between 2007 and 2011 to some relevant industry 
characteristics suggested by the literature, with an emphasis on the extent of market power 
and of financial pressure. We find a positive and statistically significant association between 
the growth rate of estimated mark-ups and both our direct measure of market power and our 
proxy of financial pressure. 
Keywords: mark-ups, returns to scale, production function, market power, financial 
pressure, GMM estimator, rolling regression. 
JEL Classification: C23, C26, D24, E31, L11, L16. 
 
 
Resumen 
Este documento analiza la evolución dinámica de los márgenes precio-coste utilizando 
microdatos de empresas y prestando una atención particular al período de crisis (2008-
2011). Con este fin, se emplea el modelo econométrico desarrollado por Klette (1999) para 
estimar los márgenes precio-coste marginal a partir de una muestra muy amplia y 
representativa de sociedades no financieras españolas para el período 1995-2011, tanto a 
nivel agregado como por ramas de actividad y por tamaños de empresa. Los resultados de 
las estimaciones revelan un patrón creciente de los márgenes precio-coste bastante 
generalizado a partir de 2008, tanto por sector como por tamaño de empresa, tras una 
etapa previa de relativa estabilidad. Además, con el objetivo de interpretar dicho patrón 
creciente, se han estimado unas regresiones sencillas, que relacionan el cambio entre 2007 
y 2011 en los márgenes empresariales en el ámbito del sector a dos dígitos con algunos 
determinantes sugeridos por la bibliografía económica, con un énfasis especial en los 
derivados del poder de mercado y de las tensiones financieras. Los resultados de este 
ejercicio de estimación muestran que existe una relación positiva y estadísticamente 
significativa entre la tasa de variación de los márgenes estimados y las medidas que 
aproximan el poder de mercado y el grado de presión financiera en cada rama de actividad. 
Palabras clave: márgenes precio-coste, rendimientos a escala, función de producción, 
poder de mercado, presión financiera, estimador GMM, rolling regression. 
Códigos JEL: C23, C26, D24, E31, L11, L16. 
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1 Introduction 
The study of the behavior of price-cost margins is central in industrial organization and in 
competition economics, but also, in no less amount, in macroeconomics, as it plays a key 
role in a number of theoretical models that are at the heart of modern macroeconomics. How 
markups move, in response to what, and why, is crucial to understand how different shocks 
are transmitted through the pricing mechanism – or in other words, through the dynamics of 
inflation –. Even though it is a challenging task trying to measure and explain the evolution of 
an aggregate markup – whether at an industry- or country-level –, this paper tries to 
contribute to this understanding by applying a well known microeconomic structural 
framework (Hall’s approach) to the recent Spanish experience.     
Besides estimating price-cost margins, in this paper we will study the behavior of this 
variable through the lens of the adjustment process followed by the Spanish economy. After a 
decade of strong economic growth and capital inflows, Spain accumulated large and closely 
interconnected external and internal imbalances, in particular, very high domestic and external 
debt levels. The adjustment process to these imbalances is on-going but not completed yet, 
and it mainly requires that Spain moves towards persistent current account surpluses to 
reduce its stock of net external liabilities. Currently most of the shift of resources towards the 
tradable sector is being facilitated by improvements in cost competitiveness driven by 
adjustments in unit labor costs (ULC), while price-cost margins seem to be lagging behind, as 
approximated, for instance, by the profit share of non-financial corporations –defined as the 
ratio of gross operating surplus over gross value added–. Figure 1.1, which displays this 
variable calculated with data from National Accounts, reveals that the profit share increased 
notably since 2008, despite the deep economic crisis in Spain. Although this evidence is 
suggestive, it has to be recalled that this proxy is subject to several caveats. 
Hence, in order to study the behavior of price-cost markups this paper descends to 
the level where they are determined, i.e. the firm level, and follows the econometric framework 
laid out in Klette (1999) – who draws from Hall (1988, 1990) – for the estimation of price-cost 
markups using a panel of firm-level data. One of our contributions is to estimate the 
econometric model on a comprehensive panel of firms’ accounting information covering most 
of the non-financial corporate sector over the period 1995-2011 from the Central Balance 
Sheet Data Office of the Banco de España.1
In order to examine likely explanations of the estimated dynamic performance of 
price-cost margins during the period 2008-2011, we use a simple regression framework. In 
 This data set allows us an extensive analysis of 
the dynamic behavior of price markups across several dimensions, notably, industry and size. 
An additional novelty is to employ rolling regression techniques in order to attain temporal 
variability in estimated markups. Our estimates reveal a common pattern in the performance 
of Spanish firms’ price-cost markups across industries and size categories – with some subtle 
differences to be discussed below – consisting of a significant increase of estimated markups 
since 2007, after a rather stable period oscillating around 1.20. This fact suggests that there 
must be some common factors explaining this behavior of markups, in particular during the 
recent crisis period. 
                                                                            
1. Most papers using similar conceptual frameworks only focus on manufacturing firms, such as Klette (1999), De 
Locker and Warzynski (2012) or Cassiman and Vanormelingen (2013) for the case of Spain. See Siotis (2003), in the 
case of Spain, for an exception. 
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this empirical exercise, we regress the (log) change in estimated markups for each industry 
between 2007 and 2011 against a set of (industry-level) explanatory variables that account for 
some of the main determinants identified in the literature. Among these driving factors, we 
pay special attention to two of them that we believe are particularly suited to the Spanish 
case. The first one is related to the high degree of financial pressure faced by Spanish firms, 
in terms of both high levels of corporate leverage and tight financing conditions. In these 
circumstances, as already advanced, inter alia, by Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) and 
Gilchrist et al. (2013), firms may be driven to set relatively high margins, even in the face of 
weak demand, in order to be able to meet their ongoing financial commitments, as well as to 
build buffers of internal funds to finance investment projects. Our paper thus makes another 
contribution to the existing empirical literature examining the role of financial frictions on the 
cyclicality of markups. 
The second one is connected with the fact that some industries in the Spanish 
economy are frequently characterized by a relatively low degree of product market 
competition. Further, the current economic meltdown has brought about a large increase in 
the pace of business destruction, along with a notable sluggishness in business formation –
see below–. This has resulted in a significant reduction in the number of competitors, which 
may have enhanced surviving firms’ market power. In this context, these firms would be able 
to charge larger markups despite being faced with a declining demand. 
As it turns out, we find compelling evidence in favor of both hypotheses. Firstly, it is 
estimated a fairly robust positive and statistically significant association between our direct 
measure of market power (the level of markups in 2007) and the growth rate of estimated 
markups between 2007 and 2011. As regards the other variable of interest, we also find a 
quite strong positive, and statistically significant, relationship between our preferred measure 
of financial pressure – the debt ratio – and the growth rate of markups. 
The rest of the document is organized as follows. Section 2 spells out the empirical 
approach, which is based on Klette (1999). Section 3 presents the main characteristics of 
the database and the variables used. Next, in Section 4 we provide the estimates for the 
price-cost markups. In Section 5 we relate the estimated markups to a few industry 
characteristics in order to explain their increase in the crisis period. Finally, Section 6 gives 
some concluding remarks. 
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2 Empirical Strategy 
We introduce an empirical model to obtain firm-level markups relying on standard cost 
minimization conditions for variable inputs free of adjustment costs in a Neoclassical setting. 
This is, essentially, the approach developed by Robert Hall in successive papers (1986, 88, 
90), and which is the basis for many papers trying to estimate price-cost markups relying on 
microdata from accounting information. One of those papers is Klette (1999), which we will 
follow because it presents several advantages over the standard Hall’s approach – as it will 
be discussed below –. 
At a firm level, the appropriate model of production relates gross output (Y) to 
primary inputs of capital (K) and labour (L), as well as purchased intermediate inputs (M). We 
assume that all firms can use the following Neoclassical production function: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑇𝑖𝑡𝐹𝑡(𝐾𝑖𝑡 , 𝐿𝑖𝑡 ,𝑀𝑖𝑡)                                                          (1) 
where t denotes time and i is the firm’s subscript. The stock of capital may be a dynamic 
input of production, while Tit represents a firm-specific productivity factor and the function Ft(∙) 
can change freely between years. In other words, the model does not impose restrictions on 
the form of technical progress, which can be factor augmenting. We further assume that the 
function Ft(∙) is homogeneous of degree γ in all inputs. Klette (1999) proposes to derive a log-
linear approximation of equation (1) around a point of reference by using a generalized mean 
value theorem, instead of a Taylor approximation. This point of reference can be thought of as 
the representative’s firm level of output and inputs for each year and sector of activity.2
𝑦�𝑖𝑡 = 𝜀?̅?𝑘,𝑖𝑡𝑘�𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀?̅?𝑙,𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀?̅?𝑚,𝑖𝑡𝑚�𝑖𝑡 + ?̂?𝑖𝑡                                       (2) 
 Then, 
it can be derived the following expression: 
where lower case letters with a hat represent the log-deviation from the reference point of the 
corresponding upper case variable (e.g. 𝑦�𝑖𝑡 = ln (𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑌0𝑡)); and 𝜀?̅?𝑗 represents the output 
elasticity of factor J (J = K, L, M) evaluated at an internal point between Jit and the reference 
point J0t.  
Several comments are required as regards the benefits of this particular theoretical 
framework. Firstly, in the empirical specification the reference point usually chosen is the 
median firm within the industry in each year, either for the output or for the inputs. This choice 
has several advantages, such as for instance allowing for unrestricted technical change by 
changing the reference point year by year. But the main advantage of this approach is that it 
can be avoided the difficulty of obtaining appropriate deflators, as the standard source of data 
is firms’ accounting information in nominal values, but such deflators are usually available at 
the industry level, which are frequently contaminated by noise and do not reflect the large 
heterogeneity across firms within a sector. This way we avoid introducing an additional 
estimation bias derived from using industry-level deflators,3
                                                                            
2. See Klette (1999) for all the details. 
 as we will be assuming that the 
3. As Klette and Griliches (1996) show, the use of industry-wide deflators results in estimated parameters in a production 
function setting that are mixtures of supply- and demand-side coefficients, and thus are biased. In particular, they show 
that within a fairly conventional demand-side modeling, the elasticity of scale tends to be downward biased (below one), 
which, given expression (8) below, would be transmitted to the estimated markup. 
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markups in equation (7) are constant across firms in the same sector of activity (see below). 
The error term in this equation will thus capture differences in the markup and scale 
parameters across firms [see Klette (1999)], which will motivate, along with the endogeneity of 
productivity, the use of instrumental variables estimation methods. 
Secondly, equation (2) is a relationship in terms of cross-sectional differences in 
output and inputs between firms, and such differences can be of a magnitude of several 
hundred percent in many industries. Under these circumstances, a Taylor approximation 
might be problematic, but the mean value theorem provides an approximation more robust 
and suitable for samples with any magnitude of cross sectional differences.4
As we allow the stock of capital to be a quasi-fixed input of production, we make 
use of the Euler’s Theorem for homogeneous functions to replace the output elasticity of 
capital in expression (2), since it ensures that there is a close relationship between the degree 
of returns to scale and the output elasticities of productive inputs: 
 
?̅? = 𝜀?̅?,𝑘 + 𝜀?̅?,𝑙 + 𝜀?̅?,𝑚                                                          (3) 
We now assume that all producers active in a market are cost minimizing and, 
further, that they are price-takers in input markets.5
𝑤𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑀𝐶𝑡 ∙ 𝐹𝑡,𝑗(𝑡)                                                            (4) 
 Then, it can be shown that the following 
first-order condition holds for any variable input –free of adjustment costs–: 
where wj,t denotes the price for input j at time t, MCt the marginal cost and Ft,j(t) is the partial 
derivative with respect to input j at time t. It is important to remark that expression (4) holds 
for all variable factors of production and that we assume that the stock of capital (K) is a 
quasi-fixed input of production. 
A final step to obtain an equation for the price-cost markup (µt) is to define it as the 
ratio between the price of output (Pt) and the marginal cost of production: 
𝜇𝑡 ≡
𝑃𝑡
𝑀𝐶𝑡
                                                                     (5) 
It has to be noticed that this definition of the markup is consistent with many price setting 
models, both static and dynamic, and does not depend on any particular form of price 
competition among firms. It is important to realize, however, that equation (5) allows us to 
identify the markup from the difference between price and marginal cost, but this does not 
mean anything in terms of equilibrium. In equilibrium, markups will be determined depending 
on the specific model of competition and strategic interaction between firms. 
Hence, by combining equations (4) and (5), and with a bit of algebra, we can derive 
the following relation: 
𝜇𝑡 = 𝜀�𝑗,𝑡𝑠?̅?,𝑡                                                            (6) 
                                                                            
4. See Klette (1999) for a deeper discussion of this point. 
5. The subsequent derivation would also be consistent with a right-to-manage bargaining framework, as shown by 
Dobbelaere and Mairesse (2011). 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 11 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1407 
where ?̅?𝑗,𝑡 measures the share of input j’s expenditure on total revenues (e.g. wjJ/PyY for j = 
L, M in this case). This expression is crucial to the identification of the markup and, along with 
equation (2), forms the basis for the estimation of markups in many approaches. In particular, 
the combination of both equations results in an empirical specification that allows one to 
obtain average estimates of both the markups of price over marginal cost and the elasticity of 
scale and which is quite standard in the literature: 
𝑦�𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖𝑡 ∙ �?̅?𝑦𝑙,𝑖𝑡(𝑙𝑖𝑡 − 𝑘�𝑖𝑡) + ?̅?𝑦𝑚,𝑖𝑡(𝑚�𝑖𝑡 − 𝑘�𝑖𝑡)� + 𝛾𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝑘�𝑖𝑡 + ?̂?𝑖𝑡               (7) 
Basically, this relationship, together with some stochastic assumptions to be presented 
below, provides the empirical specification to be estimated. Thus far, the set of assumptions 
imposed on technology and firms’ behavior has been minimal and fairly general. This model is 
consistent with non-constant returns to scale –one of the main criticisms received by the early  
Hall’s papers– and with the presence of market power, and would be consistent with a fair 
amount of game theoretic pricing decisions. It also allows for the possibility of quasi-fixed 
factors of production (capital, in our case). 
However, as stressed by Crépon et al. (2005) and Dobbelaere and Mairesse 
(2011), many papers find it difficult to identify and estimate both the elasticity of scale and 
the markup within this framework. To see why this is the case, notice that under cost 
minimization and appealing to Euler’s Theorem for homogenous functions, the degree of 
returns to scale (γ) equals the ratio of average to marginal cost. Simple algebra shows that 
there is a tight link between the markup of price over marginal cost, the average profit ratio 
(P/AC) and returns to scale: 
𝛾 = 𝐴𝐶
𝑀𝐶
= � 𝑃
𝑀𝐶
� ∙ �
𝐴𝐶
𝑃
� = 𝜇 ∙ (1 − 𝑠𝜋)                                      (8) 
where sπ is the share of pure economic profits, i.e., profits attained in excess of the 
remuneration of productive inputs.6
 The problem of jointly estimating both parameters is worsened when we try to obtain 
time-varying estimates, because of the smaller sample used for each regression. Thus, in 
order to avoid being too demanding of the dataset and of the empirical framework that we 
use, we prefer to fix the elasticity of scale to some predetermined value and then check the 
robustness of our results to such choice. To that end, we will choose the degree of returns to 
scale so as to be consistent with the long-run properties of our conceptual framework. In the 
long run, when pure profits should be close to zero with free entry, the markup should be 
close in value to the scale parameter. Given that diminishing returns would imply that firms 
consistently price output below marginal cost, which makes no economic sense, this entails 
that firm-level returns must be either constant or increasing in the long run. We will assume 
slightly increasing returns to scale (i.e. γ=1.1), in accordance with the aggregate evidence 
 This expression will allow us to obtain an estimation of the 
share of pure profits, once we have estimated the elasticity of scale and the markup. Equation 
(8) also tells us that the source of profits lies in either imperfect competition or decreasing 
returns to scale. 
                                                                            
6. This can be seen by defining total costs as c(w,y) and pure profits as π=py-c(w,y). Then, it follows that 𝑠𝜋 = 𝜋𝑝𝑦 =1 − 𝑐(𝑤,𝑦)
𝑝𝑦
= 1 − 𝐴𝐶
𝑝
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presented in Appendix A, but the robustness of our results to this assumption will be 
checked, as we explain below. 
An additional step to close the econometric model is to make the appropriate 
assumptions for the term ?̂?𝑖𝑡 in equation (7), which represents the firm’s productivity relative 
to the reference firm. As productivity differences tend to be highly persistent over time7
?̂?𝑖𝑡 = 𝑡𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                              (9) 
, it 
makes sense to assume the following error structure: 
where ti is treated as a fixed effect, and thus is allowed to be freely correlated with all the 
variables in equation (7), while uit is a random error term representing transitory and 
idiosyncratic differences in productivity with the usual properties. 
And finally, we will assume that the markups in equation (7) are constant across 
firms in the same sector of activity and, as we mentioned above, an elasticity of scale of 1.1 
for all firms. Therefore, as we already pointed out, the error term will have a component 
measuring the differences between the firm-specific parameter and the common one. 
In this setting, it is obvious that equation (7) cannot be estimated with OLS methods 
because of a problem of endogeneity between productivity shocks and input demand and 
because of the homogeneity imposed on the markup parameter. Given the difficulty in finding 
good “external” instrumental variables in a context of a firm-level production function, a 
natural estimator to use is the GMM estimator. Thus, we choose the GMM difference 
estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991), in which first differences of the variables are taken to 
eliminate the time-invariant effects and then appropriate lagged levels of the regressors are 
used as “internal” instruments for their first-differences. In particular, we assume that all 
productive factors are predetermined with respect to idiosyncratic productivity shocks (uit) so 
that instruments lagged t-2 and earlier are assumed (and tested) to be valid for the equation 
in first differences.8
Lastly, some additional comments are needed in order to understand the type of 
estimation exercises that we are going to undertake in this paper. Because it is more 
important for us to have an idea of the dynamics of estimated markups than their precise 
point estimates, we have decided to present most of our results in terms of rolling 
regressions, whereby the equation (7) will be estimated using rolling windows of 4 years.
 Finally, note that the predeterminedness assumption made for estimation 
implies that current shocks to firm’s productivity (uit) do have an effect on future input 
demand, which seems sensible at the frequency of yearly data considered here.  
9
                                                                            
7. See the recent survey by Syverson (2011). There can be several explanations for this: firms may differ in the quality of 
its management, quality of labour, capital vintage, innovativeness, etc. 
  
8. Of course, fixed effects ti is not the only reason why productivity shocks can be correlated with lagged factor input 
variables. Another reason is the presence of serial correlation in uit. This can be easily tested in the GMM framework. 
9. For each new estimation subsample, a new year (t+1) of observations is included, and the first period (t-3) is removed, 
and therefore we can assign most of the difference in parameter estimates across windows to the new year included, as 
it accounts for roughly 25% of total observations. However, the lags (t-2, t-3, etc) of regressors that we use as 
instrumental variables can overrun the 4-year subsample period.      
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3 Data 
We use a sample of non-financial firms covering almost all (two-digit) industries for the period 
1995-2011 (see Table 3.1 for a list of sectors). The sample is based on firm-level information 
from the Central Balance Sheet Data Office (CBSO) of the Banco de España. These data are 
collected from two sources: first, a CBSO’s own database elaborated from a yearly survey 
and balance-sheet information of firms collaborating on voluntary grounds10 – which shall be 
called CBA –; and second, data from financial statements deposited yearly in official Firm 
Registries by all active companies – which we will label CBB –.11
One of the advantages of combining both databases is that we achieve a selection 
of firms reasonably representative of the population, as can be seen in Table 3.2, where we 
compare the shares of firms by both sector of activity and firm size. A second advantage is 
that we attain a sample with a very good coverage rate, potentially of over 50% of 
nonfinancial corporations’ value added.
  
12
Although the quality of the data is reasonably good as it passes numerous filters, we 
were very careful with outliers and/or incoherencies. In our study only operating firms with at 
least 1 employee throughout the year have been included,
 
13 and those which existed for less 
than 3 consecutive years were eliminated. We dropped all observations that did not report the 
required variables, as well as those with strange values, such as negative figures of 
employment, capital stock, sales or assets, or extreme ones.14 After cleaning the data, we 
were left with an unbalanced panel of firms covering the period 1995-2011,15
Output and inputs are measured relative to the median values for the industry to 
which the firm belongs. The industry median values are estimated separately for each year, 
which is required to allow the technology to change freely over time, as we mentioned above. 
As we also mentioned in Section 2, this method has the additional benefit of eliminating the 
need for deflating nominal variables.  
 with information 
for a median (mean) of 7 (7.3) years of 347,317 firms (2,034,200 observations in total). The 
basic characteristics of this sample of firms are displayed in Table 3.3.  
The output variable is measured in gross terms, i.e. inclusive of intermediate 
consumption, while we take into account the presence of 3 productive inputs: capital, 
intermediate inputs and labour. Labour refers to the average number of employees in each 
                                                                            
10. The reporting firms fill in a questionnaire with detailed accounting information, as well as some other additional 
information on employment, breakdown of the workforce in terms of skills, type of contracts, spending on training or 
R&D expenditures. For a complete description of both CBA and CBB databases refer to the CBSO’s Annual Report: 
http://www.bde.es/bde/en/secciones/informes/Publicaciones_an/Central_de_Balan/anoactual/ . 
11. CBA+CBB data consists mainly of individual entrepreneurs, public corporations and limited liability companies. Self-
employed workers are excluded. 
12. In 2010, the last complete year available, the coverage rate was 52% of gross value added. 
13. We thus remove so-called individual entrepreneurs. 
14. We removed observations with extreme value added per unit of labour or extreme capital per unit of labour. Outliers 
were defined as deviations from the interquartile range exceeding 3 in absolute value for each year and each two-digit 
industry. We also dropped firms with excessive changes of employment, defined as those outside the percentiles p1 and 
p99, for each year and two-digit industry. 
15. The coverage of 2011 is only partial with about 120,000 observations compared with about 172,000 observations 
on average for the period 2001-2010. 
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firm for each year, and materials refer to intermediate consumption. The capital stock is 
measured by the net book value of fixed assets, as reported in the firm’s balance sheet.16
The theoretical framework presented in Section 2 includes the share of factor 
costs over the value of gross output (𝜀?̅?𝑗), evaluated at some internal point between the 
reference point (the industry-year median value) and the observed level of operation for the 
firm in question. We follow Klette (1999) and approximate these shares by taking the 
average value of the share for the observed firm and the year-industry median share.
  
17
                                                                            
16. We are aware of the problems that this generates, because they are valued at historical prices, but this is the only 
proxy we have at our disposal. Moreover, it has the advantage of being based on direct information provided by the firm, 
in contrast with the approaches that use the perpetual inventory method, which rely on strong assumptions on estimates 
of industry-specific depreciation rates and user costs of capital. 
 
17. This would be an exact approximation for a translog technology. 
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4 Estimates of markups 
As we explain in Section 2, we will present the results from estimating equation (7) once we 
have fixed the elasticity of scale to 1.1. We have also repeated all the estimation exercises to 
be presented here using other values for the elasticity of scale, such as 0.8, 0.9, 1.0 and 1.2. 
We found that the results were unaltered in terms of the shape of the estimated markup over 
time. The only difference was with respect to its magnitude, with the following relationship: 
the larger the scale elasticity, the larger the estimated markup (see Appendix B). 
Figure 4.1 shows rolling regression estimates of the average markup of price over 
marginal costs for the sample of all firms pooled together. As it can be seen, the estimated 
markup remained broadly stable around 1.2 until 2007, when it rises steadily towards 1.3 by 
2011. This result would be consistent with the aggregate evidence shown in Section 1, where 
the profit share rose markedly since 2008. As we explain above, there is a close relationship 
between the markup, the elasticity of scale and the share of “pure” profits –see equation (8)–. 
We exploit this relationship in order to estimate the profit share implicit behind the estimated 
markup, which we plot in Figure 4.2.18 The implicit share of aggregate economic profits is 
more volatile than the underlying markup and, moreover, it jumped more markedly, from 
about 6% of total revenue to about 15%.19
Next, we show in Figure 4.3 estimation results by size strata. Irrespective of their 
sector of activity, firms are pooled into the following groups by the average number of 
employees: 1-5; 6-9; 10-19; 20-49; 50-99; 100-249; 250-499; and over 500. The results 
show that, indeed, we can split firms into 3 groups because their estimated markups 
display a similar behavior within those groups. To be more specific, we can group firms for 
1-19 employees – which we will label as “small firms”, see panels A-C in Figure 4.3 –, for 
20-249 employees – or “medium-sized firms”, see panels D-F in Figure 4.3 –, and for over 
250 employees – labeled as “large firms”, see panels G-H in Figure 4.3 –. This way, it is 
interesting to notice that initially all estimated markups tended to increase after 2007, but 
while markups for medium-sized firms continued rising, those for smaller and larger firms 
tended to fall back towards pre-crisis levels by 2011. In other words, the aggregate 
behavior detected in Figure 4.1 would be mainly driven by the estimated markups for firms 
between 20 and 250 employees.  
 Thus, it seems that, overall, Spanish businesses 
seem to be trying to improve their financial situation in the period 2008-2011. We will study 
below why this might be the case. 
  Subsequently, we take into account the sectoral dimension. Since presenting and 
commenting results for all 57 industries considered would be a cumbersome process, we 
have pooled all firms by main aggregate sector of activity instead, i.e. primary sector, 
manufacturing industries, public utilities sector, construction, and market and non-market 
services (see left column, Table 3.1). Estimated markups at a 2-digit level (57 industries) will 
                                                                            
18. The standard deviation of the estimated profit share is computed using the Delta Method applied to equation (8). 
19. This range is not unusual in this type of estimation exercises. For instance, if we compute the implied profit share in 
Klette’s Table II estimates, we would find a range between 4.7% and 13.5%. This is a good test of consistency between 
theory and practice which not all papers pass. The existence of large pure economic profits would not be consistent with 
a competitive market with free entry in the long run.  
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be used, however, in Section 5 below, when we try to ascertain the determinants of the 
increase in estimated markups after 2007.20
Results for the 6 main aggregate sectors of activity are reported in Figure 4.4, where 
one can see that, first of all, the dynamic behavior of estimated markups is quite similar 
across industries, except in the sector of utilities (see panel C in Figure 4.4).
 
21 Their 
performance is rather stable until 2007 – with the notable exception of the primary sector,22
As an additional remark, it has to be noticed that our estimated markups of price 
over marginal costs are in line with results in previous studies using firm-level data. For 
instance, for the case of Spain, and without the aim of being exhaustive, Cassiman and 
Vanormelingen (2013) find average markups of 1.32 (median margins of 1.20) for a sample of 
manufacturing firms during the period 1990-2008.
 
which is more volatile, see panel A –, and then there is a significant increase with a varying 
intensity across sectors. Besides, it is quite notable the degree of synchronization achieved by 
markups in the three main sectors of activity – market services, manufacturing and 
construction –, although the rise in price-cost margins since 2007 is lower in the construction 
sector (see panel D in Figure 4.4). Regarding the sector of utilities, the estimated markups 
remained relatively stable around 1.3 until 2007, and then they fell towards 1.1 by 2011. 
23
As regards the evidence for other countries, De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) report 
the median markup to be around 1.20-1.30 for Slovenian manufacturing firms, while Klette 
(1999) estimates small markups for a sample of Norwegian manufacturing firms, between 
0.65 and 1.09. Dobbelaere and Mairesse (2011) use a panel of French manufacturing firms 
over the period 1978-2001 and estimate a bunch of price-cost markups that fall between 
0.90 and 1.60. 
 Fariñas and Huergo (2003) using the 
same database (“Encuesta sobre Estrategias Empresariales”), but a different time period 
(1990-1998) and methodology, estimates price-cost margins (adjusted for the business cycle) 
for manufacturing firms of between 1.03 and 1.18. Siotis (2003), on the contrary, employs the 
CBA database for the period 1983-1996, which is a sample with wider industry coverage –
encompassing also the services sector –, although biased towards larger businesses. He 
estimates two(and three)-digit sectoral Lerner indexes ranging from 0.132 to 0.850, which 
correspond to price-cost markups in the range 1.15-6.67. This wide range is probably 
motivated by the small number of observations existing for some of the industries considered. 
Further, the numerous regressions estimated have been tested by means of the two 
more common specification tests used in the GMM setting, namely, the Hansen-Sargan test 
of overidentification and the AR(2) tests for first-differenced residuals, as suggested by 
Arellano and Bond (1991). In order to assess the results from these tests, it has to be taken 
into account how we decided our strategy for choosing the instrument set. Since we had to 
                                                                            
20. In Appendix C we show estimated average markups for the 57 industries under study in two moments of time: 
2001-2007 and 2008-2011. It can be observed that most 2-digit industries increased their price-cost margins in the 
latter period vis-à-vis the former one. 
21. The utilities sector contains companies such as electric, gas and water firms and integrated providers, i.e. heavily 
regulated industries. 
22. The primary sector of the economy extracts or harvests products from the earth, including the production of raw 
materials and basic foods. Activities associated with this sector include agriculture (both subsistence and commercial), 
mining, forestry, farming, grazing, hunting and gathering, fishing, and quarrying.  
23. Indeed, these markups cannot be directly compared with ours because they are estimated using value added 
instead of gross output. Assuming a share of materials similar to the median share in our sample (around 0.60), their 
average markup would be 1.11 (median markup of 1.07). 
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estimate a considerable amount of regressions,24
Hence, we chose a common set of instruments across specifications. We restricted 
the instrument set to 3 variables: the stock of capital (𝑘�𝑖𝑡), employment (𝑙𝑖𝑡 ) and intermediate 
inputs (𝑚�𝑖𝑡). As we explain in Section 2.2, we assume – and test – that these variables are 
predetermined. As regards the number of lags to be used as instruments, we follow the 
literature and choose a low number (3 lags) in order to avoid overfitting and problems of weak 
instruments.  
 we faced a trade-off between simplicity and 
precision when choosing the appropriate set of instrumental variables. Because we are more 
interested in the dynamic behavior of price-cost markups than in their specific point estimate, 
we opted for the former.  
Figure 4.5 shows a scatter plot where each dot represents the p-values from the 
specification tests mentioned above for the 57 industry-specific estimation results for three 
different sample periods (1995-2000, 2001-2007 and 2008-2011). The vertical axis contains 
the p-value for the Hansen-Sargan test of overidentification, while the horizontal axis 
represents the p-value for the AR(2) tests for first-differenced residuals. The dashed lines are 
depicted at the 5% level. Given the homogeneity imposed in the set of instruments, the 
results can be regarded as quite reasonable. Most parameters tend to be in the upper-right 
quadrant, while few of them tend to fall in the lower-left quadrant. 
Thus far, we have done a sort of descriptive exercise, trying to measure the markup 
of price over marginal cost. All in all, our estimation results show that, after a relatively stable 
period, there is a widespread pattern of increasing price-cost markups across industries and 
size categories – with some subtle differences – since 2007. This empirical regularity suggests 
that there must be some common factors explaining a good chunk of this behavior of 
markups during the recent crisis period. In the following section, we will provide some clues 
as regards why the estimated markups have risen so much in the latter period of the sample, 
paying special attention to common drivers. 
                                                                            
24. Note, for instance, that we have estimated equation (11) for 57 panels of firms split by 2-digit industries; or for 8 
panels of firms by size strata. Moreover, since we use rolling regression techniques, we have the additional time 
dimension that implies 13 point estimates (from 1999 through 2011). 
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5 Interpreting the increase in estimated markups since 2007 
The notable increase in price-cost margins since 2007 that we have estimated in the previous 
section might seem somehow counterintuitive for an economy undergoing a deep economic 
crisis, such as the Spanish one. However, although the literature has not reached a 
consensus in this regard yet, there are many papers, both theoretical and empirical, that 
argue that markups are countercyclical indeed, in particular for the US economy. In the case 
of Spain, Estrada and López-Salido (2005) use industry-level data for the period 1980-2002 
to provide empirical evidence that aggregate markups are procyclical, as the procyclicality in 
manufacturing industries tends to dominate the countercyclical behavior in market services. 
Fariñas and Huergo (2003) also confirm the procyclical behavior of markups in manufacturing 
using firm-level data for 1990-1998. 
On the contrary, our paper provides strong evidence that, at least for the most 
recent downturn, price-cost margins behaved countercyclically. There may be several 
reasons for such behavior,25
Indeed, this type of hypothesis had already been advanced, inter alia, by Chevalier 
and Scharfstein (1996) for the US case. They build, and test, a theoretical model of markets 
with consumer switching costs – customer market model – and capital-market imperfections. 
In such a model, during a recession, when firms have lower cash flows and greater difficulty 
raising external funds, firms will try to boost current profits to meet their liabilities and finance 
investment. They may do so by increasing prices and forgoing attempts to build market 
share. Since the firm may default, it has less incentive to build market share, because it may 
not reap the benefits of such “investment” in the future. They provide empirical evidence in 
support of this theory using pricing data from the supermarket industry in the early 1990s, a 
period in which there was both a recession and the aftermath from the boom in leveraged 
buyouts of the 1980s. 
 but for the purpose of our paper, we would like to highlight two 
of them. The first one is related to the high degree of financial pressure faced by Spanish 
firms, in terms of both high levels of corporate leverage and tight financing conditions. In 
these circumstances, firms may be driven to set relatively high margins, even in the face of 
weak demand, in order to be able to meet their ongoing financial commitments, as well as to 
build buffers of internal funds to finance investment projects and to protect against eventual 
funding shocks. One way to illustrate this point is to have a look at Figure 5.1, where we plot 
the change in estimated markups by industry between 2007 and 2011 against the average 
debt ratio in 2007 by industry – see below for more details –. In this Figure we can see that 
industries with higher debt ratios tended to experience larger increases in their markups. 
A more recent contribution in this same spirit is that of Gilchrist et al. (2013), who 
investigate the effect of financial conditions on the price-setting behavior of US firms during 
the 2008-2009 financial crisis. They find strong evidence that at the peak of the crisis firms 
with relatively weak balance sheets increased prices, while firms with strong balance sheets 
lowered them. Moreover, they explore the implications of financial distortions on price-setting 
within the context of a New Keynesian framework that allows for customer markets and 
financial frictions. They find that their model implies a substantial attenuation of price 
                                                                            
25. See the classical reference Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) for a comprehensive analysis.  
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dynamics relative to the baseline model without financial distortions in response to 
contractionary demand shocks. 
The second main hypothesis is connected with the competitive setting in which 
firms have to operate. To begin with, there is a certain degree of consensus that the 
Spanish economy is characterized by a relatively lower level of product market competition 
in some industries than in peer developed economies. This feature has not been 
substantially altered during the crisis period, given that it depends on institutional and 
regulatory factors that evolve slowly over time.26 Moreover, the current economic meltdown 
has entailed a large increase in the pace of business destruction, along with a notable 
sluggishness in business formation (see Figure 5.2). This has resulted in a significant 
reduction in the number of competitors across most industries, which may have enhanced 
surviving firms’ market power, as highlighted by the Industrial Organization literature (e.g. 
Campbell and Hopenhayn, 2005). In this context, one would expect a relatively high degree 
of persistence in the low level of product-market competition in the Spanish economy in the 
most recent period. In such a setting, firms would be able to charge larger markups despite 
being faced with a declining demand.27
In view of the above discussion, in this section we investigate how the estimated 
markups from Section 4 correlate with some sector-specific variables in the most recent 
period, characterized by a deep economic crisis. These variables are chosen so that we can 
control for the typical factors affecting the evolution of price-cost margins considered by the 
literature (see, e.g., Dobbelaere and Mairesse, 2011, or Cassiman and Vanormelingen, 2013, 
for some recent contributions), such as size, capital intensity or R&D intensity, as well as the 
two main issues we believe lie behind that evolution, namely the (increased) presence of 
financial pressure and market power.  
  
To this end, we will retrieve the estimated markups for the 57 two-digit industries 
that we consider and we will correlate them with a set of regressors (Xi,2007) calculated for the 
average28 2007 firm in each industry in our sample.29
∆?̂?𝑖,2011/2007 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1′𝑋𝑖,2007 + 𝜀𝑖                                        (10) 
 More specifically, we will estimate the 
following regression: 
by Weighted OLS – where the weight is defined as the share of each industry in total gross 
value added – and where i=1,…,57 represents each industry. The dependent variable is the (log) 
change between average (estimated) markups for the period 2001-2007 and for the period 
2008-2011 for each of the 57 sectors. The first relevant regressor is the proxy for financial 
constraints. We build several measures of financial pressure, based on both stocks and flows of 
financial liabilities, and both of them are typical of the literature on financial frictions. Thus, the 
first measure is built as the average debt ratio for each industry, which is defined as total 
                                                                            
26. See The Global Competitiveness Report 2013-2014 for an international comparison in which Spain comes out poorly 
in terms of product market competition. Besides, the different competition-related indicators available do not show a 
relevant improvement in the most recent period, even though some relevant product market reforms have been 
approved. 
27. See Etro and Colciago (2012) for a theoretical model developing this sort of behavior, who also find some empirical 
support for the US case. 
28. Estimation results are robust to the use of the median, instead of the mean. Indeed, the degree of statistical 
significance increases with the median. 
29. Although we do not attempt at making a strict causal interpretation of this regression exercise, it should be noted 
that this specification helps minimize the problem of endogeneity, as all regressors would be determined prior to the 
crisis period. 
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liabilities adjusted for short-term assets – i.e., short-term financial assets plus cash and other 
liquid assets – over total assets. The second measure is the total debt burden ratio, defined as 
the ratio between financial expenditures plus total short-term liabilities over cash flows. This last 
item is calculated as the sum of gross operating surplus and financial income. 
Further, we also try to account for the degree of product market competition 
across industries, as we discussed above. To this end, we rely on the (log of) our estimated 
markups for 2001-2007 as a direct measure of market power: the larger the estimated 
markup, the larger the (inherent) market power, so we might expect a positive correlation 
between our proxy of market power and the change in markups. Unfortunately, we would 
have liked to include some variable accounting for the impact of business dynamics on 
market competition during 2008-2011 as well, such as the net business entry rate, but it 
would be subject to a severe problem of endogeneity, difficult to tackle in our setting.30
 As regards the rest of regressors in Xi,2007, we also include a measure of 
concentration, which is a traditional proxy for market structure and, indirectly, market 
power. Specifically, we compute the in-sample Herfindahl-Hirschman (HH) index of 
concentration, which is the sum of the squared market shares in sales. We thus follow 
Geroski (1990) who argues that the degree of rivalry in a market is difficult to determine 
with any precision, and probably cannot be completely captured by just one variable. He 
therefore suggests using several measures of rivalry, so that one can capture different 
aspects of market power in an industry.
 This 
notwithstanding, to the extent that, as we argue above, market power presents a high 
degree of persistence, due to both institutional and business dynamics factors, our proxy 
would also be capturing part of those dynamic effects. Indeed, the argument of high 
persistence is underpinned by the results of Cassiman and Vanormelingen (2013). They test 
a dynamic specification for price-cost margins in which the lagged markup is statistically 
significant, with values in the range of 0.3-0.4. Moreover, they compute a 5-year transition 
matrix between different quintiles of the distribution of estimated markups and find that they 
display a substantial amount of persistence. 
31
  We include also a set of additional control variables that should allow us to better 
capture the partial correlations we are interested in. We take account of a proxy for average 
firm size, which we measure by the log of the stock of capital in 2007 – defined as before, 
i.e. net book value of fixed assets –. The effect of capital requirements on markups during a 
(deep) recession may be twofold (see e.g. Odagiri and Yamashita, 1987). On the one hand, 
because it works as a barrier to entry, it reinforces concentration and, thus, market power, 
so is likely to increase markups. On the other hand, it may deter exit rather than entry in a 
recession, because the stock of capital usually constitutes a sunk cost, in which case in an 
industry with larger capital requirements markups may decrease so as to maintain a higher 
rate of capacity utilization.   
  
                                                                            
30. We have run some regressions in which we included the net entry rate for the year 2007, both alone and interacted 
with the estimated markup for 2007, as a way of accounting for the impact of business dynamics on market 
competition. Results, available upon request, show that the coefficient for net entry tends to be negative and, in some 
specifications, statistically significant. This means that in those industries with higher net entry of new businesses before 
the crisis, there was a lower increase in estimated markups during 2008-2011. 
31. For instance, he uses 6 measures of rivalry: the extent of market penetration by entrants, the market share of 
imports, the relative number of small firms (<99 employees), the 5-firm concentration index, the change in concentration 
and the market share of exiting firms. 
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 We account for the degree of an industry’s innovativeness, or alternatively R&D 
intensity, with the ratio of the book value of intangible assets to total assets, which is expected 
to increase market power in a given sector and, thus, price-cost margins, through either product 
differentiation or better productive efficiency (see Cassiman and Vanormelingen, 2013). As 
suggested by Sutton (1998), a large R&D intensity may also be the reflection of an endogenous 
reaction of firms to potential entry, thus creating a barrier to entry. 
 Table 5.1 shows the results from estimating equation (10) by WLS. As it can be 
seen, we find a fairly robust positive and statistically significant association between our 
preferred measure of financial pressure – the debt ratio – and the growth rate of markups.32 A 
similar result (not reported) is obtained when our “flow” variable, the total debt burden ratio, is 
used instead of the debt ratio, except for a certain loss of statistical significance.33 This result 
would provide support for the thesis that the financial difficulties experienced by Spanish firms 
may be behind the estimated increase in price-cost markups during the current economic 
crisis. As regards the other variable of interest, we also find a quite strong positive, and 
statistically significant, relationship between our direct measure of market power (the level of 
markups in 2007) and the growth rate of estimated markups. In other words, the increase in 
price-cost margins have tended to be larger the higher the industry’s market power. 
Moreover, the coefficient linked to the concentration index turns out to be negative, but not 
significant,34
 As regards the other variables, the only one which is consistently significant is the 
industry’s average stock of capital, with a negative sign, which would lend support to the 
barrier-to-exit interpretation that in industries with higher capital needs markups tend to be 
lower in order to preserve a higher rate of capacity utilization.
 which would point to the fact that the degree of concentration does not seem to 
be problematic in terms of degree of competition. 
35
Finally, in columns [6] and [7] we check the robustness of our results to the 
composition of our sample in terms of industries included. First, we remove the observations 
from non-market industries, such as social services, health, education or sports, where 
pricing decisions may not be driven by market forces. This results in a certain increase in 
statistical significance. However, when we drop the observations from two outliers,
 In other words, the difficulties 
in putting fixed tangible assets into liquidation could be having a discouraging effect on 
business exit rates, thus entailing a relatively large number of competitors, which would put 
downward pressure on markups of surviving businesses.  
36
                                                                            
32. Similar results are obtained when we use the total debt ratio, instead of our measure corrected for short-term assets. 
 namely, 
“coke and refined petroleum products” and “electricity, gas and water”, we lose some 
statistical significance. 
33. Interestingly enough, when we include both variables at the same time in regression (13), the total debt burden loses 
statistical significance, while the debt ratio remains highly significant.  
34. We obtain similar results when we replace the HH index with the four-firm concentration ratio (CR4), another typical 
measure in the literature. 
35. We could interpret the negative coefficient for the stock of intangible assets in a similar vein, as it might be working 
also as a barrier to exit. 
36. These are extreme observations in the sense that, as it can be observed in Figure 5.1, their change in estimated 
markups between 2007 and 2011 is highly negative compared with the rest. 
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6 Conclusions 
This paper has presented the results from estimating price-cost markups following a 
standard econometric framework used in the literature. The econometric model has been 
estimated on a comprehensive panel of firms’ accounting data covering most of the non-
financial corporate sector over the period 1995-2011. This data set has allowed us an 
extensive analysis of the dynamic behavior of price-cost margins across several 
dimensions, namely, industry and size. Our estimation results reveal a common pattern 
across industry and size categories characterized by a significant increase of estimated 
markups since 2007, after a rather stable period oscillating around 1.10-1.20. This fact 
suggests that there must have been some common factors explaining this behavior of 
markups, in particular during the recent crisis period. 
In the second part of the paper, we have examined some likely explanatory factors 
underlying the estimated dynamic performance of price-cost markups in the most recent 
period. To this end, we have employed a simple empirical framework whereupon we have 
regressed the change in estimated markups for each industry between 2007 and 2011 
against a set of relevant regressors identified in the literature. We are particularly interested in 
the Spanish experience, which motivates us to study two hypotheses behind such 
countercyclical behavior of estimated markups. The first one is related to the high degree of 
financial pressure faced by Spanish firms, in terms of both high levels of corporate leverage 
and tight financing conditions. In these circumstances, as recently stressed by Gilchrist et al. 
(2013) for the US case, firms may be driven to set relatively high margins, even in the face of 
weak demand, in order to be able to meet their ongoing financial commitments. 
The second one is connected with the fact that the Spanish economy is 
characterized by a lower level of product market competition across industries than in peer 
developed economies. We have argued that this is a persistent feature that may have 
worsened during the current economic meltdown, which has brought about a large increase 
in the pace of net business destruction – thus enhancing surviving firms’ market power –. We 
found compelling evidence in favor of both hypotheses. There is a positive and statistically 
significant association between our preferred measure of financial pressure – the debt ratio– 
and the growth rate of estimated markups between 2007 and 2011. We also found a quite 
strong positive, and statistically significant, relationship between our direct measure of market 
power (the level of markups in 2007) and the growth rate of markups.  
 Although these results must be interpreted with due caution, some interesting policy 
implications can be drawn. As we have mentioned in the introduction, the current adjustment 
in the external competitiveness of the Spanish economy is relying mostly on labor shedding 
and wage moderation. On the contrary, as we have shown in this paper, the estimated price-
cost margins would be lagging behind that adjustment. As argued, inter alia, by Blanchard 
and Giavazzi (2003), from a political economy point of view, it is difficult to sustain this 
unbalanced adjustment process for a long time, unless it is accompanied by deep reforms in 
goods markets. Product market deregulation should curtail firms’ market power, thus 
reducing price-cost markups and, hence, improving households’ disposable income. 
 The Spanish economy has been involved in an ongoing process of deregulation and 
structural reform for some time, the results of which will take time to materialize. Indeed, as 
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our results show, the increase in price-cost margins has been larger in industries where 
market power was larger. Therefore, it is necessary to keep the reform impetus to strengthen 
competition in product markets, so that the evolution of price-cost markups is more 
consistent with the absorption of macroeconomic imbalances and enhanced social welfare. 
This notwithstanding, these conclusions must be qualified by the complex 
relationship existing between firms’ markups and their financial health. To the extent that the 
financial difficulties are a widespread phenomenon, a significant fall in price-cost margins 
could have such a strong impact on firms’ balance sheets that it could affect their possibilities 
of survival, as well as their investment and employment decisions. This situation would call for 
complementary measures in the financial side, as for instance, debt relief programs or 
improvements in the efficiency of bankruptcy system. The evidence presented in this paper 
suggests that any attempt to understand price-cost margins in the aggregate must account 
for firms’ differential access to capital markets across time. The interaction between a firm’s 
balance sheet position and its pricing decision is an interesting avenue for future research.  
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 24 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1407 
7 References 
ABBOTT, T., Z. GRILICHES and J. HAUSMAN (1998). “Short run movements in productivity: Market power versus 
capacity utilization”, In Practicing econometrics: Essays in method and application, ed. Zvi Griliches, 333–42. 
Cheltenham, UK: Elgar. 
ARELLANO, M. and S. BOND (1991). “Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence and an 
application to employment equations”, Review of Economic Studies, 58, pp 277-297. 
BASU, S. (1996): “Procyclical productivity: increasing returns or cyclical utilization?”, The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, August, pp 719-751. 
BASU, S. and FERNALD (1997). “Returns to scale in US manufacturing: Estimates and implications”, The Journal of 
Political Economy, 105, pp 249-283. 
— (2001). “Why is productivity procyclical? Why do we care?”, in Hulten, C., Dean, E. and Harper, M. (eds.), New 
Developments in Productivity Analysis, University of Chicago Press. 
BLANCHARD, O. and F. GIAVAZZI (2003). “Macroeconomic effects of regulation and deregulation in goods and labor 
markets”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 118, No. 3, pp 879-907. 
CAMPBELL, J. and H. HOPENHAYN (2005). “Market Size Matters”, Journal of Industrial Economics, vol. 53(1), pp 1-25. 
CASSIMAN, B. and S. VANORMELINGEN (2013). “Profiting from innovation: Firm level evidence on markups”, IESE 
Business School Working Paper. 
CHEVALIER, J. and D. SCHARFSTEIN (1996). “Capital-market imperfections and countercyclical markups: Theory and 
evidence”, The American Economic Review, Vol. 86, No. 4, pp 703-725. 
CRÉPON, B., R. DESPLATZ and J. MAIRESSE (2005). “Price-Cost Margins and Rent Sharing: Evidence from a Panel of 
French Manufacturing Firms”, Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ENSAE, issue 79-80, pp 583-610. 
DE LOCKER, J. and F. WARZYNSKI (2012). “Markups and firm-level export status”, American Economic Review, 102(6), 
pp 2437-2471. 
DOBBELAERE, S. and J. MAIRESSE (2011). “Panel data estimates of the production function and product and labour 
market imperfections”, Journal of Applied Econometrics, vol. 28(1), pp 1-46. 
ESTRADA, A. and D. LOPEZ-SALIDO (2005). “Sectoral markup dynamics in Spain”, Banco de España Working Paper 
0503.  
ETRO, F. and A. COLCIAGO (2010). “Endogenous market structures and the business cycle”, The Economic Journal, 
120 (December), pp 1201-1233. 
FARIÑAS, J.C. and E. HUERGO (2003). “Profit Margins, Adjustment Costs and the Business Cycle: An Application to 
Spanish Manufacturing Firms”, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, vol. 65(1), pp 49-72. 
GEROSKI, P. (1990). “Innovation, Technological Opportunity, and Market Structure”, Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 42, 
No. 3, pp 586-602. 
GILCHRIST, S., R. SCHOENLE, J. SIM and E. ZAKRAJSEK (2013). “Inflation dynamics during the financial crisis”, 
mimeo. 
HALL, R. (1986). “Market Structure and Macroeconomic Fluctuations”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 2, 
pp 285-322. 
— (1988). “The relationship between price and marginal cost in the US industry”, The Journal of Political Economy, 96, 
pp 921-947. 
— (1990). “Invariance properties of Solow’s productivity residual”, in Diamond, P. (ed.), Growth, Productivity, 
Unemployment (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.). 
KLETTE, T.J. and Z. GRILICHES (1996). “The inconsistency of common scale estimators when output prices are 
unobserved and endogenous”, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 11, pp 343-361. 
KLETTE, T.J. (1999). “Market power, scale economies and productivity: Estimates from a panel of establishment data”, 
The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. XLVII, No.4, pp 451-476. 
ODAGIRI, H. and T. YAMASHITA (1987). “Price markups, market structure and business fluctuations in Japanese 
manufacturing industries”, The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. XXXV, No. 3, pp 317-331. 
ROTEMBERG, J. and M. WOODFORD (1999). “The cyclical behavior of prices and costs”, in Taylor, J. and Woodford, 
M. (eds.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, vol. 1B (North Holland: Amsterdam, New York and Oxford). 
SIOTIS, G. (2003). “Competitive pressure and economic integration: an illustration for Spain, 1983-1996”, International 
Journal of Industrial Economics”, 21, pp 1435-1459. 
SUTTON, J. (1998). “Technology and market structure”, MIT Press: Cambridge, MA. 
SYVERSON, C. (2011). “What determines productivity?”, The Journal of Economic Literature, 49:2, pp 329-365. 
WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM (2013). The Global Competitiveness Report 2013-2014, World Economic Forum, Geneva. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 25 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1407 
8  Tables and Figures 
Table 3.1. List of industries considered in the CBSO’s sample 
 
 
 
CBSO's Industry Clasification
(CBSO's code)
1 Crop and animal production,hunting and related service activities 
2 Forestry and logging 
3 Fishing and aquaculture 
4 Mining and quarrying  
5 Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco  
6 Manufacture of textiles, wearing apparel and leather and related products 
7
8 Manufacture of paper and paper products 
9 Printing and reproduction of recorded media 
10 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products 
11 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 
12 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations  
13 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 
14 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 
15 Manufacture of basic metals 
16 Manufacture of fabricated metal products,except machinery and equipment 
17 Manufacture of computer,electronic and optical products 
18 Manufacture of electrical equipment 
19 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 
20 Manufacture of motor vehicles,trailers and semi-trailers 
21 Manufacture of other transport equipment 
22 Manufacture of furniture and other manufacturing 
23 Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 
24 Electricity,gas,steam and air conditioning supply 
25 Water collection, treatment and supply  
26 Sewerage, Waste collection, treatment and other waste management services   
27 Construction
28 Trade and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles  
29 Wholesale trade, except motor vehicles and motorcycles  
30 Retail trade, except motor vehicles and motorcycles  
31 Land transport and transport via pipelines  
32 Water transport  
33 Air transport  
34 Warehousing and support activities for transportation  
35 Postal and courier activities  
36 Accommodation and food service activities
37 Publishing activities  
38
39 Telecommunications  
40 Computer programming, consultancy and related activities; Information service activities     
42 Real estate activities 
43 Legal and accounting activities; Activities of head offices; management consultancy activities 
44 Architectural and engineering activities;technical testing and analysis 
45 Scientific research and development 
46 Advertising and market research 
47 Other professional, scientific and technical activities; Veterinary activities 
48 Rental and leasing activities 
49 Employment activities 
50 Travel agency, tour operator and other reservation service and related activities 
51
52 Education 
53 Human health activities 
54 Social work activities 
55
56 Sports activities and amusement and recreation activities  
57 Repair of computers and personal and household goods 
58 Other personal service activities  
Note: Sector 41 "Activities of holding corporations, without administrative or management purpose" is missing because all firms in the sample 
belonging to this industry are dropped.
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Security and investigation activities; Services to buildings and landscape activities; Office administrative, 
office support and other business support activities
Motion picture, video and television programme production, sound recording and music publishing 
activities; Programming and broadcasting activities    
Creative, arts and entertainment activities; Libraries, archives, museums and other cultural activities; 
Gambling and betting activities     
Manufacture of wood and products of wood and cork;except furniture;manufacture of articles of straw and 
plaiting materials 
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Table 3.2. Sample composition by size and industry 
Source: Directorio Central de Empresas (INE); Authors’ calculations. 
 
Table 3.3. Summary statistics for the estimation sample. All firms. 
 
  
Main summary statistics. 1995-2011.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Q1 Q2 Q3
(thousands €)
Y 2754.08 71222.18 0.61 2.07E+07 192.54 445.09 1119.48
L 19.67 330.78 0.01 67183 3 5.85 12
K 734.79 33925.01 0.05 1.24E+07 22.62 68.73 216.21
M 1994.28 60926.12 0 2.01E+07 98.68 263.37 737.56
(Growth rate)
dY 0.012 0.269 -4.086 4.063 -0.100 0.024 0.141
dL -0.001 0.291 -4.545 3.754 -0.074 0 0.082
dK 0.026 0.454 -4.880 6.834 -0.171 -0.044 0.101
dM 0.011 0.354 -8.599 9.009 -0.1318 0.021 0.167
(thousands €/employee)
Y/L 107.142 99.646 4.113 10897.86 48.091 75.994 129.225
K/L 39.507 159.333 0.034 4223.18 4.670 11.796 28.934
(Ratio)
Lshare 0.309 0.179 0.007 1.625 0.168 0.280 0.415
Mshare 0.612 0.199 0 1 0.481 0.634 0.769
#Observations: 2034200 (except for growth rates: 1569678)
 
Sample composition by industry and firm size: CBA+CBB vs Population (DIRCE)
Average Employment Shares for 1999-2008.
Firm size:
Industry: DIRCE CBA+CBB DIRCE CBA+CBB DIRCE CBA+CBB
PRIMARY SECTOR 0.677 0.766 0.162 0.132 0.116 0.078
MANUFACTURING 0.714 0.582 0.137 0.212 0.101 0.154
UTILITIES SECTOR 0.877 0.664 0.047 0.131 0.032 0.093
CONSTRUCTION 0.812 0.714 0.106 0.170 0.061 0.094
MARKET SERVICES 0.903 0.796 0.055 0.121 0.028 0.062
NON-MARKET SERVICES 0.840 0.782 0.077 0.117 0.051 0.075
Firm size:
Industry: DIRCE CBA+CBB DIRCE CBA+CBB DIRCE CBA+CBB
PRIMARY SECTOR 0.026 0.016 0.012 0.006 0.006 0.003
MANUFACTURING 0.026 0.029 0.012 0.013 0.010 0.010
UTILITIES SECTOR 0.014 0.036 0.011 0.028 0.019 0.049
CONSTRUCTION 0.014 0.016 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.002
MARKET SERVICES 0.007 0.012 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.003
NON-MARKET SERVICES 0.018 0.018 0.009 0.006 0.006 0.002
<10 employees 10-19 employees 20-49 employees
50-99 employees 100-199 employees >200 employees
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Figure 1.1. Profit share of non-financial corporations 
Source: National Accounts (INE).  
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Figure 4.1. Estimates of the price-cost markup. ALL FIRMS. 
 
Figure 4.2. Implicit estimates of the rate of pure profits. ALL FIRMS. 
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Figure 4.3. Estimates of the price-cost markup by SIZE STRATA. 
(Panel A: 1-5 employees) 
 
(Panel B: 6-9 employees) 
 
(Panel C: 10-19 employees) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.8
.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
Ma
rku
p S
ize
 = 
1
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Year
(4-year rolling windows; 10% confidence intervals)
Rolling Regression (GMM): Estimates of price-cost margin
.8
.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
Ma
rku
p S
ize
 = 
2
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Year
(4-year rolling windows; 10% confidence intervals)
Rolling Regression (GMM): Estimates of price-cost margin
.8
.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
Ma
rku
p S
ize
 = 
3
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Year
(4-year rolling windows; 10% confidence intervals)
Rolling Regression (GMM): Estimates of price-cost margin
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 30 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1407 
Figure 4.3. Continued. 
(Panel D: 20-49 employees) 
 
(Panel E: 50-99 employees) 
 
(Panel F: 100-249 employees) 
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Figure 4.3. Continued. 
(Panel G: 250-499 employees) 
 
(Panel H: 500+ employees) 
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Figure 4.4. Estimates of the price-cost markup by AGGREGATE INDUSTRY. 
(Panel A: Primary industries) 
(Panel B: Manufacturing industries) 
(Panel C: Utilities industries) 
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Figure 4.4. Continued. 
(Panel D: Construction sector) 
 
(Panel E: Market-Services industries) 
 
(Panel F: Non-Market Services industries) 
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Figure 4.5. Specification tests. 
(Panel A: 57 industries; 1995-2000) 
 
(Panel B: 57 industries; 2001-2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Panel C: 57 industries; 2008-2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
ha
nse
nte
st1
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
ar2test1
AR(2) test and Hansen-Sargan Test; p-values
Specification tests for GMM estimator: 1995-2000
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
ha
ns
en
tes
t2
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
ar2test2
AR(2) test and Hansen-Sargan Test; p-values
Specification tests for GMM estimator: 2001-2007
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
ha
ns
en
tes
t3
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
ar2test3
AR(2) test and Hansen-Sargan Test; p-values
Specification tests for GMM estimator: 2008-2011
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 35 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1407 
Figure 5.1. Change in industry’s markups between 2007 and 2011  
against the (average) debt ratio in 2007. 
 
Figure 5.2. Business creation and destruction in Spain.(*) 
(*) Note: It includes data for public corporations, limited liability corporations and individual 
entrepreneurs. 
Source: Directorio Central de Empresas (INE) 
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Table 5.1. Regression results for the determinants of the growth rate  
of estimated markups between 2007 and 2011. 
  
Estimation results for equation (X). Weighted-OLS.
Dependent variable: Change in markups between 2011 and 2007.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Log(µι, 2007)
-0.007
(0.525)
0.738 *
(0.442)
0.323 
(0.319)
    0.557 **
(0.254)
    0.690 **
(0.282)
    0.902 ***
(0.290)
   0.540 **
(0.224)
Debt ratio 0.564 **
 (0.275)
 0.475 **
 (0.210)
 0.464 ***
 (0.171)
   0.501 ***
 (0.172)
   0.579 ***
 (0.174)
 0.256 **
 (0.102)
HH index -0.340 *
 (0.178)
-0.118
 (0.102)
-0.116
 (0.097)
-0.095
 (0.096)
-0.053
 (0.051)
Log(Ki,2007)
-0.036 ***
 (0.009)
 -0.039 ***
 (0.009)
  -0.040 ***
 (0.009)
 -0.014 *
 (0.007)
Intangible assets -0.281
 (0.193)
 -0.358 *
 (0.185)
-0.318 **
 (0.142)
Constant 0.028
(0.082)
-0.364
(0.184)
-0.233 *
(0.122)
-0.109
(0.093)
-0.110
(0.092)
-0.171 *
(0.190)
-0.071
(0.072)
Observations 57 57 57 57 57 46 44
R-squared 0.000 0.220 0.351 0.590 0.599 0.646 0.258
Significance: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. Weights: Share in gross value added.
All explanatory variables are dated 2007. 
Column [6]: Excludes observations from Non-Market activities, as well as the Primary Sector.
Column [7]: As in column [6], and it also excludes observations from "Coke and refined petroleum products" 
and "Electricity, gas and water".
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APPENDIX A. Estimating the degree of returns to scale for the Spanish economy 
In order to attach a reasonable value to the elasticity of scale, we will follow the approach 
suggested by Susanto Basu and co-authors,37
𝜇 ∙ 𝑠𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛾 ∙ 𝑐𝑗,𝑡                     (A1) 
 which essentially is a variant of Hall’s 
approach, to estimate the degree of returns to scale. Thus, we start from the same 
conceptual framework as in Section 2.1. It can be shown that by combining equations (4), (6) 
and (8) one can find the following relationship between price-cost markups (µ) and returns to 
scale (γ) for productive input j = K, L, M: 
where cj,t is defined as the share of costs for input j in total cost, and the rest of variables 
have been defined previously.38
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝛾 ∙ �𝑐𝐿,𝑡∆𝑙𝑡 + 𝑐𝑘,𝑡∆𝑘𝑡 + 𝑐𝑀,𝑡∆𝑚𝑡� + ∆𝑡𝑡 = 𝛾 ∙ ∆𝑥𝑡 + ∆𝑡𝑡                 (A2) 
 Replacing this expression into equation (7), one obtains the 
relation that will serve as the basis for estimating the degree of returns to scale: 
We follow then the standard practice of applying firm-level theory to relatively 
aggregated data and use a panel of industries defined at approximately the two-digit level of 
the National Accounts classification in order to estimate equation (A2). To be more specific, 
we use a balanced panel for 34 industries that together constitute the sector of non-financial 
corporations for 1995-2010 and which basically correspond with the industries considered in 
Section 3.   
We assemble a database with National Accounts data on output and input (log) 
growth rates for each industry. Output is defined as real gross output; while employment is 
measured in thousands of employees in full-time equivalent units. The user cost of capital is 
estimated as the real interest rate charged by financial institutions to firms39
As regards the method of estimation, we face a similar problem as in Section 2.1, 
namely, the endogeneity of technology shocks and inputs choice, so we present regression 
results for both the pooled OLS and the GMM estimators. In the latter case, and in order to 
avoid overfitting and weak instruments, we restrict the instrument set to only one lag of the 
regressor –the weighted average of input growth, ∆xt –.  
 plus the 
depreciation rate. We also use information from the data-set elaborated by Fundación BBVA, 
which includes capital in nominal and real terms. 
Moreover, as argued among others by Basu and Fernald (2001), it is important to 
account for variable utilization of both capital and labor services. Otherwise, growth rates of 
the observed capital stock and labor do not capture the full service flows from those inputs 
and the regression suffers from measurement error, which would bias the estimated 
elasticities.40 Hence, we draw from Basu and Fernald (2001) when we attempt to control for 
variable service flow from inputs. They show that changes in hours per worker provide an 
index of unobserved changes in the intensity of work. This suggests a regression such as (14) 
expanded with an additional regressor, namely, ∆ht the growth rate of hours per worker.41
                                                                            
37. See, inter alia, Basu and Fernald (1997). 
 
38. This condition holds in the long run, when all productive factors are variable. 
39. We assume that the real interest rate is the same across branches. 
40. The resulting estimate of γ would not be consistent unless the cost-weighted sum of the growth rates of the 
observed inputs (K and L) is identically zero or uncorrelated with the instruments. Neither condition is plausible. 
41. Earlier work by Abbott et al. (1998) also runs this type of regression to control for variable utilization. 
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Besides, they also show the conditions under which this type of regression corrects for 
variable capital utilization as well as work effort. 
Table A.1 reports our estimates from equation (A2), and its extension with hours per 
worker –columns [2] and [4]–, while Figure A.1 shows rolling regression estimates of the 
elasticity of scale in order to check its stability through time. The first row in Table A.1 shows 
the estimates of the elasticity of scale. All coefficients are statistically significant and very close 
to each other, between 1.10 and 1.16, irrespective of the estimation method or the use of the 
proxy for variable factor utilization. All estimates, besides, reject the hypothesis of constant 
returns to scale (see last row in Table A.1), except for that in column [4] –although by a small 
margin–. Thus, it seems that the production function of Spanish non-financial corporations 
shows evidence of (small) increasing returns to scale on aggregate.  
Additionally, the rolling regression results reported in Figure A.1 display a reasonable 
degree of stability in the estimated elasticity of scale. This parameter oscillates around 1.10 in 
OLS estimates and around 1.2 in GMM ones. Consistent with this evidence, we choose an 
elasticity of 1.1 as our reference for the estimation of markups in Section 4. 
 
Table A.1. Estimation results for the elasticity of scale. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Aggregate estimates of the elasticity of scale
Dependent variable: gross output growth
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Returns to scale (γ) 1.156 *** 1.154 *** 1.131 *** 1.100 ***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.063) (0.066)
Hours worked 0.399 ** 1.016 ***
(0.151) (0.370)
Observations 510 340 476 306
R-squared 0.975 0.976
Hansen-Sargan test (p-value) 0.797 0.768
AR(2) test for residuals (p-value) 0.123 0.115
F-test for CRS: γ = 1 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.039 0.134
Note: Sample period is 1996-2010. Estimates of eq. (14). All regressions include time dummies. 
All regressions are weighted by the share of each industry on total gross output.
Instruments are the second lag of ∆x and of ∆hours.
OLS GMM
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Figure A.1. Rolling estimates of the elasticity of scale. 
Panel A. 
 
Panel B. 
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APPENDIX B. Estimates of the price-cost markup. ALL FIRMS. 
DIFFERENT ELASTICITIES OF SCALE. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Blue line: elasticity of scale = 0.8; Red line: elasticity of scale = 0.9; Green line: elasticity 
of scale = 1.0; Orange line: elasticity of scale = 1.1; Black line: elasticity of scale = 1.2. 
APPENDIX C. ESTIMATES FOR 2001-2007 VS 2008-2011. 57 (2-DIGIT) INDUSTRIES. 
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